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Beasts, according to Leibniz, possess the ability to perceive connections be ..
tween past events and to consequently elaborate· expectations concerning the
development of present events. This ability is due to the faculty of recalling
Images of past sensations (memoratlva) that accompanies Imagination, and not
to "thought''. as it is to be found in" rational beings. Leibniz writes in the Nq_u.:
yeau.~ essay~ that the empirical linking made by beasts is nothing bu~ "une
#
ombre du raisonnement ... une connexion d'imagination et un passage d'une
image a une autre; parce que dans une rencontre nouvelfe qui paroit sembfabfe a
fa precedente, 'on s'attend de nouveau a ce qulon y trouvoit joint autrefois" (A
VI 6, 51). His alter ego Theophlle praises Locke's denial to beasts of any aptl.
tude for abstract knowledge: they proceed from image to image merely "par la
liaison. qu'elles y ont sentie autres fois" (A VI 6, 143). If the master takes a stick,
the dog remembers to have been beaten - the image of the strokes it received...
in the past comes back to its imagination - and it behaves according to its
instinctive reaction to blows. In the Monadolo~, Leibniz states at the hand of
the same example that memory confers to the soul Uune espece de Consecu ..
tion" (GP VI, 61(). that can imitate rational thought to some extent Beasts
retain perceptions that were very intense, or that presented themserves many
times. When they perceive something that strikes (frape~.) them - this time
not as a blow - they recollect something similar that happened previously and
expect "par fa representation de leur memoire a ce qui y a ete joint dans catta..
perception precedente et sont portes a des sentimens semblables a ceux qu'ils
avoiant pris alors" (lb.).
Among the traditional functions of imagination. this doctrine lays stress on
memory and on imagination in the strict sense (Yl~.J[I!aglna~i~~).Together with
the so call~d common sense. they apparently take charge of aU the operations
relating to sensible knowledge, and make up the Imagination In a more general
sense - i.e., according to Leibnlzt the Internal sense. For Instance, it was
common opinion that a "vis cestlmativa" formed a first judgeme(lt~of the ..species. ,
of the common sense (thUS explaining, by the way. animal behaviours like those
we are discussing). But in Leibniz's opinion. the represen~~ons of the Internal
sense suffice to direct the appetition, even without any conscience of past
thoughts: uln brutis ftaque perceptlonem agnosco slve sensum eorum qu~ flunt.
agnosco et imaginationem, sensu cessante manentem, et ideo recursum priorum
imaginumt si qua nova imago uni priorum similis occasionem prcebeat; sed non
agnosco in illis conscientiam, ut scilicet oblata quadam cogitatione percipiant
eam vel aliam simiJem, jam sibi affuisse" (VE 290).
Human reason on the contrary is conscious, reflects on past thoughts,
knows and extrapolates the causes of eventst and therefore needs not
"
ud'experimenter les liaisons sensibles des imagest OU les betes sont reduites" (A
VI 6 5 I). But Leibniz maintains that human beings are similar to beasts, when
they base their decisions on the memory of past facts; disciplines based on
experience, as medicine, also partake of such non-rational knowledge: "Les
hommes agissent comme les betes en tant que les consecutions de leur percep-
tions ne se font que par Ie principe de la memoire, ressemblans aux Medecins
Empiriquest qui ont une simple practique sans theoriet et nous ne sommes
qu'Empiriques dans les trois quarts de nos Actions" (GP VI, 61 I). This kind of
cognition pervades our everyday life; e.g. we expect that the sun will rise to ...
morrow since we anticipate it empirically, because it always happened previ-
ously: ull n'y a que l'Astronome, qui Ie juga par raison" (lQ.). Of course, physiw
cians do not entirely depend on the association of imaginations and appetitions.
Even if they make use of empirical knowledge without trying to corroborate it
by a rational analysis, i.e. without any knowledge of the causes, they attain a
higher degree of generality then beasts. In a letter, Leibniz attempts to define
the djfference between an expert of some art and someone who only knows its
rules in theory: "sciendum est, artem [medicam] atsi non ad Socratem pertineat,
tamen nee ad hominem tantum referri, sed ad talem hominem, co)ericum, febri
laborantem, et a medico experto etiam in curando animum dirigi ad universalia
seu ad ea, in quibus Socrates iis quibuscum antea egit Medico assimiJatur.
Experd igitur prrerogativa super eum qui sola habet pr;;ecepta, in his potissimum
consistit, quod peritus in iis qure jam expertus est, plus habet fiducire, quam is
qui pr3!cepta tantum tenet, si non et rationes (ut plerumque fit) intelligat" (GP
Vllt 472; Leibniz criticises Aristotle, Met.) I, 981 a J 5 f.). An "expert" physician,
who builds his superior knowledge on the memory of past cases (Uimaginatione
priora aut similia repr~sentanten, ib.), is thus trying to grasp at least some
universal features. We may hence assum~ that a first difference between hu-
mans and beasts, as far as the role of imagination in empirical knowledge is
concerned, consists in the way human beings integrate the support of the
imagination with some intellectual element.
It is anyway clear ~hat both beasts and human beings, though the latter to a
lesser extent, make use of the imagination to decide their behaviour. So the
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imagination seems to playa role not only In cognition, but in volition as well.
Bacon distinguished three kinds of imagination in his. Silvasilvarum: "Prima est
conjuncta cum fide rei futurae; secunda cum memoria praeteritae; tertia est
praesentis; aut quasi praesentis, qua complector qUicquid imaginatio confingit &
animi gratia fabricat" (Opera omnia, 1665, p. 956). The first kind is indeed
connected to volitions, since it provides a representation of the object to the
appetition. We find occasionally similar expressions in Leibniz, but mostly In the
years when he still used "imagination" to mean "representation" or "thought" In
general; e.g. in 1670, in his sketches for the Elementa juris naturalis: "fateor esse
stultum sed felicem qui quod bono deest possit imaginatione fortuita supplere"
(A VI I, 432). Imaginations are representations associated to the desire also in a
writing titled L'auteur du Reche, which dates approximately 1673: "Le Physique
du reel du Vol, par example, est I'object, ou la proye qui irrite I'indigence du
Voleur, les rayons visuels qui frappent ses yeux, et qui entrent jusque au fond de
son ame; les imaginations, les inquietudes et les deliberations qui se forment hi
dessus, et qui sa terminent en fin a la conclusion, qui est de profiter de
l'occasion, et d'entreprendre I'execution du crime" (A VI '3, ISO). But in the·
mature writings we find a more tangible relation between the ability to repre-
sent in the imagination both past events, and possible' future objectS, on one
hand, and the connection of appetite and will on the other hand. Motives are in-
ternal objects in the strict sense: "L'ame est excitée aux pensées sulvan~es par
son object interne, c'est a dire par les pensées precedentes~ Car if y a une suite
ou liaison comme dans les mom ens" (GP IIf, 464 ..65; this is ~ by the way -·the
foundation of Leibniz's Theodicy). And, as -Leibn.iz writes to Sophie Charlotte In
1704, uco":'lme Ie mouvement mene la matiere de figure en figure, I'appetit mane
I'ame d'image en image" (GP III, 347).
It is well known that Leibniz generalises the association of practical and
cognitive, and tributes to every substance perception and appetition - or, in
the rational soul, intellect and will. The genesis of the will relies in the end on a
mechanism analogue to the small perceptions; or better, it is founded on the
dynamic aspect of small perceptions: infinitesimal distressing sensations, that
bring about imperceptible appetitions. "II y a (.0.) des efforts qui resultent des
perceptions Insensibles, dont on ne s'apper~oit pas, que J'alme mleux appeller
appetitions que volitions (quoyqu'iI y ait aussi des appetJtJons' apperceptibles),
car on n'appelJeactions volontaires que celles dont on peut s'appercev~lr; et sur
les queUes nostre reflexion peut tomber lors qu'elles suivent de la consideration
du bien' et du mal" (A VI 6, 173).
The faculty of perception is common to all substances. It is one of the·
three primary faculties, corresponding to three fundamental "perfections":
perception, sensation, and intellection. In a group of recently published medico ..
philosophical handwritings, Leibnlz formulates his conception of the animal body
as uMachina Hydraulico.PneumatJco-Pyrobolica", hydraulo ..pneumatlcal and
pyrobolical (chemical) machine (see Pasini, J-.'immaginazjone in LeiQ,niz, diss.,
1991-92). It includes a physiological interpretation of perception, Ufunctio
hominis primaria". i.e. a theory of the physiological correlate - in the form of
corporeal elastic vibrations - of Leibnjz's pointillist theory of sensation, accord ..
ing to which sensations are made of innumerable imperceptible perceptive
elements. In a machine of that kind, unon tantum ..t hydraullco-pneumatic[a], sed
et pyri[a]n, movement and perception are performed in conformity to this
character. Effervescent fluids push their corporeal vessels against rigid ~parts;
thus a movement is generated, whose alternation allows locomotion. Other
vessels push against each other In equilibrium, as If innumerable minute vesicles
were enclosed in some kind of envelope and inflated all at the same time. An
external solicitation is transmitted immediately from each elastic vesicle to its
neighbours, and a small push can produce a main change.
This dynamic doctrine of perception fits quite well in Leibniz's opposition
of metaphysic, or active, and geometric, or materially passive. Moreover, those
contrivances offer such promptness and fineness in reacting to external stimuli
as required by Leibniz's doctrine of small perceptions. Each of them expresses a
conformable modification both in the body and in the soul; they all are per-
ceived, indeed. but can't draw attention individually. And since we receive
impressions from surrounding bodies In the form of small perceptions, through
such infinite environmental perceptions, each being is somewhat connected to
the whole universe. The pre-established harmony between bodies and souls is
assured by the exact c.orrespondence of insensible perceptions and elastic
corporeal modifications.
In the form of undulations of a fluid, elastic vibrations present themselves
also in the brain. The sensorium commune, according to Leibniz, might well be
«un fluide» ('IE 2233) whose movements accomplish the reception of corporeal
impressions. These compose here more complex and apperceivable patterns of
sensation, even if we aren't able to resolve them properly in their components:
«comme si on jettoit a la fois dans I'eau plusieurs pierres) car chacune feroit ses
propres cercles qui ne sa brouilleroient pas dans Ja verite» (GP 7, 557). In the
common sense, ideas are formed that refer to the objects of different particular
senses; e.g. our soul compares numbers and figures in sounds, colours or
tangible forms. The internal sense embraces both the notions of the particular
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senses and those of the common sense, and some abilities connected with these
Ideas or notions. Considered as a whole, the internal sense is in principle one·
and the same faculty (a doctrine already held by Suarez, Q12~ra omnI~, 1856·78,
III 709), better known as the imagination.
The smallest parts of natural bodies have always very quick insensible
movements, that we perceive only at the level of non-apperception. and Inter ...
pret in our Imagination as continual surfaces ~ just as we perceive the glowing
end of a segment rotating In the dark, as a circle. Through such mostly involun-
tary and automatic processes, our Imagination pre-digests for the intellect the
infinite complexity of our perceptive world, and thus builds up an Image of the
external world out of our environmental perceptions. Something similar may
occur not only concerning cognitive processes, but volitional processes as well.
The engine of the will is, fundamentally, a manifold of imperceptible events
and microscopic memories, Together they generate obscure stimuli, that cause
a sort of uneasiness we wouldn't be able to associate with pleasure or displeas-
ure: "Cette Inquietude (...) n'est pas tousjours un deplaisir; comma liaise ou Pon
se trouve, n'est pas tousjours une satisfaction ou un plaisir, C'est souvent une
perception insensible qu'on ne sauroit distinguer ny demeler qUi nous fait
pancher plustost d'un coste que de I'autre, san~ qu'on en puisse rendre raison"
(A VI 6. J 83). Leibniz's thinking can be excellently characterised as a philosophy
of oxymorons, and he coins one more oxymoron to describe these UaiguiIJons
du desir'\ these minimal elements of the volition process: "des petites douleurs
inapperceptibles". Leibniz states in a quite subtle analysis of sentiment, that they
give us the benefits of pain without its annoyanc~: ucetta continuelJe victoire sur
ces demies douleurs, qu'on sent en suivant son desir e~ satisfaJsant en quelque
fac;on a cet appetit ou a cette demangealson, nous donne quantite de demJ ..
plaisirs, dont la continuation et I'amas (...) devient enfin un plaisir antier et
veritable" (A VI 6, 165), Now will, in conformity to Lelbniz's dynamiC substance
theory, is a tendency: "Ia Volition est I'effort ou la tendence (conatY!) d'aller
vers ce qu'on trouve bon et loin de ce qu'on trouve mauvais, en serte que cette
tendence resulte Immediatement de I'apperception qu'on en an (A VI 6, 172),
And there can't be complete indifference to the alternatives considered by the
will, since no decision is taken, that isn't influenced by Imperceptible motJves:
uee sont'des determinations confuses, en sorte que souvent nous ne savons pas
ce qui nous manque H' Ces impulsions sont comme autant de petits ressdrts qUI
tachent de se debander, et qui font agir nostre machine" '(A VI 6, 166). Even If
equipoise is obtained. an imperceptible internal or external aJ~eratjon Uchangera
d'abord la balance, et les fera faire quelque petit effort pour sa remettre dans Ie
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meilleur estat qu'jJ se peut" (Ip.); so the will is modified over again and the
course of the action is affected (a process that reminds somewhat Hobbes'
reduction of the will to the last term in deliberation).
It is still unclear whether the imagination performs a relevant function for
human will. as it does in animal behaviour. In the human soul, will is determined
pardy because, partly in spite of those infinitesimal solicitations. The soul has in..
deed some power on its confuse perceptions of its own elementary motives:
"car quoyqu'elJe ne puisse changer ses passions sur Ie champ, ell~ peut y travail ...
ler de loin avec asses de succes, et se donner des passions nouvelles, et mema
des habitudes. Elle a meme un pouvoir semblable sur les perceptions plus
distinctes" (GP VI, 137 ..38). Here the will is considered as a faculty of the
..
rational soul) together with the intellect, and the acts of the will as originated,
inside processes belonging to the category of thought acts. A list of categories
and concepts, written after Leibniz settled in Hanover, enumerates the genres
of thought. In general. Leibniz writes, we "think". i.e. we act on ourselves; we
start with such immediate representations as concepts or images, i.e. sensible
and confuse knowledge that becomes distinct In the intellection; then comes the
feed-back of sensation and perception, where probably "perceive" means what
Leibniz usually calls "apperceive": "Concipimus seu imaginamur. Intelligimus (seu
disdncte concipin'lus) ..Sentimus. Percipimus (seu cum certitudine sentimus)" (VE
336). This is followed by two degrees of assurance ("Statuimus. Scimus (seu
cum certitudine statuimus)", lQ.) and by the cogniti,Q. Last comes the will: "Est
igitur velie idem quod conari seu agere ob sententiam; seu ideo quia statuimus"
(!.Q.). Will is a thought that puts in action a deliberation, actualising a tendency or
an endeavour, but it only comes after a "sententia". This word means literally
"advice''. "opinion", "intention". Leibniz explains in the ~Iementa verae pietatis
that a sententia is Ucogitatio practica, seu cogjtatio cum agendi conatu" (YE 236).
A sem~nt@ is more than a simple representation: it involves the disposition to
act In conformity to what is maintained. It implies some intent, a seed of delib ..
eradon - even if an act of the will is required to actually put it into execution.
The sententia seems to hold an intermediate place between thought and
will. But its differentia. sRecifjs:~ from representation in general, or from imagina-
tions, should be found in some more definite feature, that may account for its
intentional side, but that directly refers to its content Now in a sententia, the
plain representation of the content is accompanied with persuasion, a subjective
disposition that has. according to Leibniz, immediate practical consequences:
"Hoc scilicet discrimen est inter simplicem cogitationem seu considerationem,
Imaginationem, repraesentationem, et inter sententiam, quod is qui aliquam
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sententiam habet paratus est ad agendum modo aliquo qui sit huic, sententire
conformis" (YE 236). We saw that the will, at the microscopic level of !nquie-:
tude. is moulded by little, imperceptible appetitions; at the level of the organisa-
tion of thoughts, on the other hand, we can say that the will consists in deciding
to put in action a persuasion: if I'm persuaded that what I see is fire, I decide not
to put my hand on it - I don't want to. Conversely, representations in thought
- e.g. the sensation offered by the internal sense - must contain something
more than a simple identification of the object: the representation of a fire must
already contain an idea (i.e. the memory of an experience, or the presentiment)
of its dangerousness, in order that, by virtue of persuasion and not of further in-
spection, knowledge develops into will (there is here some resemblance with
Suarez, Opera omni'1:, 1856.78, III 650). This is required both for empirical
knowledge (the image of the fire offered by the common sense and, what is joint
to it by the imagination), and for intellectual knowledge (the adequate Idea of
fire, and the rational judgement that there really is a fire and not a resembling
appearance). Since we. are, according to Leibniz, "empirical" in most of our
decisions, it can be maintained that it is chiefly the imagination that supplies
those representations (precisely resulting of empirical concatenations,. of asso-
ciations, of sensible reminiscences) which form, joint with persuasion,the object
or motive of the will.
Leibniz presumably had no reason to confer to the cognitive faculties in
general, and to the imagination in particular, any function immediately volitional.
Nevertheless, just as beasts are directed by their imagination, that inclines their
appetitions by representing objects and events .of the past as' possibl~or as
impending, so the behaviour of rational creatures is strongly influenced by the
sam~ faculty. The quick concatenations of the imagination can persuade the
mind of certain representations, to which the will applies or from which the will
starts. The imagination, at least, provides representations that are suitable to
the needs of volitional processes, not only in their content, as we discussed
above, but presumably in their vividness and efficacy as well. In corroboration
we can adduce the remarkable disposition of the imagination to deceive our
mind. Its so-caJled chimeras are indeed a leitmotif of traditionaJ debates on the
power of imagination (a power counterbalanced by the symmetrical theme of its
weakness, due to its feebleness in comparison to present sensations and to its
doubtful hold on reality). According to Leibni'z, the imagination, or'the internal
sense, succeeds in imposing its own conclusions to the intellect Itself, even
when they are false, I.e. erroneously empirical, or merely fantastic concatena-
tions. This has considerable effects on volition, as we read In the Iheqdic)!:
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"fC'est nostre sens interne qui nous fait souvent aller trop vite; et cela se trouve
aussl dans les betes. comme lorsqu'un chien abboye contre son image dans Ie
mlrolr: car les betes ont des consecutJons de perception qui Imitent Ie raison-
nement, et qui se trouvent aussi dans Ie sens interne des hommes, lorsqu'ils
n'agissent qu'en empiriques" (GP VI, 87). When the intellect lets itself be driven
by the ufausse determination du sens interne" (jQJ, it is mislead in judging the
effects of phenomena, "e't iI en infere plus qu1eJlesne portent" (lb.).
Another interesting point is whether the Internal sense performs a deflnlte
task In this process, e.g. as collector of those "petit ressorts", just as it is a
collector of perceptions. The momentous role of the imagination in relation to
volidon could ,'est upon the fact that the internal sense performst as for the
appetitions, the same function it has towards perceptions in general. Impercep-
tible appetitions aren't heterogeneous to small perceptions, they are "des
efforts qui resultent des perceptjons insensiblesJ dont on ne s'apper~oit pas" (A
VI 6, 173); the uneasiness (jnguletud~) we mentioned above consists in the end
In a "perception insensible qu'on ne sauroit distinguer ny demeler" (A VI 6,
183). Since these Insensible appetltions are In fact the actual medium of interac-
tion, through the body, between the individual and the physical world - they
are the form in which, at a microscopic level, environmental sensations originate
- we may suggest as a conclusion that the internal sense, i.e. the imagination,
plays to some extent the role of a channel through which such environmental
perceptJons are collected and organised; here would the sentiment of phe-
nomenal reality take its form and structure its image, that would then be offered
both to knowledge and to practice.
